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Abstract: The objective of this article is to analyse how regional financial and economic differences
influence the capital structure decisions of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Specifically,
this paper considers the regional financial and economic differences in four ways: the development
of the financial sector in the region, bank market concentration, the financial cost of obtaining funds,
and regional economic development. For this purpose, we used unbalanced panel data from 26,504
SMEs across the 20 Italian regions and over the period from 2004 to 2010. This work is completed
with an analysis of a no-crisis (2004–2007) and a crisis period (2008–2010). The results show that
the regional differences in the degree of financial sector development, banking concentration, and
local economic situations have a significant impact on the leverage level of SMEs, while the cost of
obtaining funds is only relevant during a period of economic stability. These results suggest that
insights can be derived from data disaggregation at the regional level inside the same country. These
regional divergences in the capital structure of SMEs could influence regional economic resilience.
Keywords: capital structure; SMEs; regional financial sector; financial development; banking
concentration; costs of funding; financial crisis; panel data; regional economic resilience
1. Introduction
There is a broad and thorough body of literature that has investigated capital structure decisions
since the work of Modigliani–Miller [1]. Within this context, there is an extensive line of research that
analyses the institutional framework in which businesses operate. It is important to highlight that
the institutional environment is defined, among other aspects, by the degree of the development of
financial systems and the level of efficiency of legal systems. In this way, La Porta et al. [2] and Rajan
and Zingales [3] are the first to show the importance of institutional context in explaining firm leverage.
The studies that analyse the impact of institutional factors by carrying out cross-country samples of
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have been conducted by Giannetti [4], Utrero-González [5],
and Hernández-Cánovas and Koëter-Kant [6]. Giannetti [4] shows that favoured creditor rights ensure
stricter enforcement, associated not only with higher leverage but also with a greater availability of
long-term debt. Utrero-González [5] finds, for a sample of European countries, that prudent banking
regulation is positively connected with industry indebtedness, indicating that prudent rules make
it easier for firms to access credit markets. Finally, Hernández-Cánovas and Koëter-Kant [6] find
that SMEs in countries that protect their creditors and enforce existing laws are more likely to obtain
long-term bank debt.
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There are a few studies that focus their research on a regionalised approach. These studies
highlight differences in the level of debt across regions due to discrepancies between the regional
institutional systems. These differences should be considered mainly in terms of the financial system
and the level of economic development [7–9].
The aim of this paper is to analyse how regional differences in the financial and economic context
influence the capital structure decisions of SMEs. Our hypothesis is that the connection between SMEs
and the local system in which they operate is particularly intense, despite the high degree of openness
towards foreign countries that usually exists today. Though most of the studies in the literature have
not yet incorporated a regionalised approach into their analyses, we believe that this approach allows
for a better identification of the relationship between the institutional factors and the capital structure
of SMEs. This regional study contributes to this growing area of regional research and explores several
aspects that could influence regional resilience.
To accomplish the purpose of the paper, we use unbalanced panel data from 26,504 SMEs across
the 20 Italian regions and over the period from 2004 to 2010. It is essential to discover why the capital
structure of SMEs varies from region to region and identify which factors influence the financial choices
of these companies. This research is especially relevant in all countries that have regional differences,
since the policymakers might seek to eliminate the asymmetries between regions and strengthen
regional resilience.
We utilise the Italian case for a variety of reasons. First, according to Charron et al. [10], Italy is the
country with broad institutional differences across regions and a huge regional discrepancy in its level
of economic activity. As outlined by Sarno [11], the companies located in the south of Italy use more
internal resources to finance growth than firms in the northern Italian regions due to the more-strongly
binding financial constraints in the south of Italy. This result is reinforced by La Rocca et al. [7], who
highlight that a significant difference exists in the capital structure of SMEs between the north and
south macro areas of Italy and that this difference is explained by institutional factors.
This article contributes to the literature in different forms. Notably, this work complements
previous research (such as La Rocca et al. [7] and Palacín-Sánchez, di Pietro [9]) by considering together
four factors to appreciate regional financial and economic differences: the development of the financial
sector in the region, bank market concentration, the financial cost of obtaining funds, and regional
economic development. One of the principal contributions of this paper is the introduction of the
variable of the financial cost of obtaining funds, which, as far as we know, is used here for the first
time as an explanatory variable in a regional capital structure study. In our opinion, this variable
is especially important in cases such as Italy that present large differences across regions. Because
the recent financial crisis has had an impact on capital structure decisions, the crisis effect on the
explanatory variables is studied. Thus, the factors are analysed during both the no-crisis period
(2004–2007) and the crisis period. This research allows us to focus more on regional economic resilience
in the recent crisis [12], since the common view is that SMEs suffered from strong credit restriction
during the crisis. This is consistent with the observations from the Bank Lending Survey of the Central
European Bank stating that banks have, during the crisis, adopted a more severe policy for their loans
to SMEs [13]. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the literature and
our testable hypotheses. Section 3 illustrates the dataset, the variables, and the descriptive statistics.
Section 4 presents the econometric model. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes the study.
2. Literature Review and Testable Hypotheses
We present a review of the financial and economic institutional factor literature and its relationship
to the capital structure of firms. We focus on four main aspects: the development of the financial
sector in the region, bank market concentration, the financial cost of obtaining funds, and regional
economic development.
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2.1. Development of the Financial Sector
In recent years, many studies have considered the financial sector as one of the institutional factors
that can affect financial decisions. According to Beck et al. [14], financial sector development and
economic development are the most important institutional factors to explain cross-country variations
in financing obstacles. Through a survey of responses from over 4000 firms in 54 countries, they
found that, on average, firms located in countries with a more developed financial system have fewer
obstacles in obtaining external funds. Like Beck et al. [14], Nivorozhkin [15] finds a positive relation
between leverage and the proxy used for financial development. This relation was one of the arguments
that Cornelli et al. [16] advanced to explain the lower leverage of eastern companies compared to
western companies in Europe. According to these authors, the eastern countries use less debt due to
the lack of financial supply caused by the underdeveloped financial system.
A majority of the previous studies that take into account the development of the financial
sector usually carry out international comparisons [4,5,17–21]. However, recent studies such as La
Rocca et al. [7] and Palacín-Sánchez and di Pietro [9]. use the development of the financial sector to
explain regional differences inside one country since, theoretically, the same relation should exist in less
developed regions within a country characterised by large regional differences. Both studies highlight
the positive role of a developed financial sector on the use of debt, especially long-term debt.
In the specific case of Italy, the banking system is organised with national banks that have branches
throughout the country and with small independent local banks that operate in a restricted area.
Historically, Italy has been characterised by restrictive regulations in the geographical mobility of their
banks and, coupled with the peculiarities of their industrial structure based largely on a network of
small and medium-sized enterprises, local banks have been a primary agent in the development of
local economies.
Considering previous studies, our primary hypothesis is as follows:
H1. A developed financial sector has a positive effect on SME leverage.
2.2. Banking Market Concentration
The effect of the banking market’s concentration on capital structure has been widely studied.
Considerable research suggests that a concentrated banking sector should facilitate credit access.
In this regard, Petersen and Rajan [22] affirm that more concentrated banking makes it is easier
for lenders to internalise the benefits of dealing with financially constrained firms. Corvoisier and
Gropp [23] show that a concentrated bank market is the result of efficient banks better exploiting
growth opportunities. However, they also find that, in this case, banks apply higher interest margins
for loans and, consequently, offer more-expensive financing.
Alternatively, there is a group of studies that conclude that a greater banking market concentration
may be linked to less credit availability. Beck et al. [14] determine that this linkage may create difficulties
for SMEs to obtain financing. Boot and Thakor [24] find that a more competitive bank system encourages
lenders to build up stronger relations with clients to mitigate asymmetry information problems.
Studies from a regional perspective evidence that differences between regional financial sectors
can help explain divergences in their capital structures, particularly concerning SMEs. Palacín-Sánchez
and di Pietro [9] show that a more concentrated regional banking sector has a negative influence on
a firm’s leverage, based on a sample of Spanish SMEs, and Coccorese [25] concludes that a bank’s
market power is quite different across different regions in Italy due to the structure of the local
banking markets. There are few branches and, in general, less competition between banks that exist in
more-concentrated markets.
According to previous studies, the relation between banking market concentration and SME
leverage is unclear. Thus, we divide the second of our hypotheses in two:
H2a. A concentrated banking market has a negative impact on SME leverage.
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H2b. A concentrated banking market has a positive impact on SME leverage.
2.3. Cost of Debt
The cost of debt directly affects capital structure. This effect depends on three components: the
general level of the interest rate, the default risk premium, and the firm’s tax rate. In this sense,
Leland [26] and Goldstein et al. [27] demonstrate that a firm’s optimal capital structure is extremely
sensitive to changes in interest rates. More recently, Deesomsak et al. [28] show that changes in interest
rates can affect capital structure, since firms are more likely to use debt when the cost of borrowing
is low. Bas et al. [29] and Bartholdy and Mateus [30] conclude that when the interest rate increases,
firms are less willing to use leverage to finance new investments because of the increase in the cost of
borrowing. Nevertheless, according to Deesomsak et al. [28], interest rates also incorporate inflation
expectations. Thus, firms could be expected to shift from equity to debt financing when interest rates
are increasing. In this case, the level of interest rates is expected to be positively related to leverage.
There is an extensive line of more specific research that studies the effect of the stochastic interest rate
on capital structure ([31,32]).
The cost of debt is especially relevant in Italy since the interest rates applied by the bank sector
vary significantly according to the region. In general, Italy is divided into two areas, the Centre-North
and the Centre-South. In the Centre-North, the interest rate applied is on average lower than is the
interest rate applied in the Centre-South. The difference in interest rates is explained, at least in part, by
a different credit risk, which is higher in the south. According to the Bank of Italy [33], the irrecoverable
debts on bank loans ratio in all south regions is higher than the corresponding national average.
Taking into account that Italy does not experience high inflation in the periods of study,
we formulate our third hypothesis as follows:
H3. The cost of debt has a negative impact on SME leverage.
2.4. Development of Economy
The relation between the development of the economy and the capital structure has been widely
analysed ([17–19,28], among others). There is a group of works that analyse, within a single country,
differences in the capital structures between regional economies [7,9,22].
In Italy, where national economic growth slowed significantly in the 2004–2010 period, regional
economic growth was significantly different among regions.
According to the research referred to above, economic growth could influence the investment
opportunities for SMEs and, therefore, SMEs could need new funds to take advantage of these
opportunities. Hence, our fourth hypothesis is as follows:
H4. Regional economic growth has a positive effect on SME leverage.
3. Data and Empirical Methodology
3.1. Data
Firm data are obtained from the Company Accounts Data Service (CADS) database, which
includes information on more than 135,000 Italian businesses operating in all industry sectors and has
been available since 1982 (CADS is provided by Centrale dei Bilanci—a company set up jointly by the
Bank of Italy, the ABI—Italian Banking Association—and other leading Italian banks. The company
collects highly disaggregated balance sheets, income statements and cash-flow statements, and detailed
information on the characteristics of Italian companies. CADS is highly representative of the population
of Italian firms, covering over 50% of the value added by those companies included in the Italian Central
Statistical Office’s Census). The firms selected conform to the European Commission’s definition of
SMEs (European Union Recommendation, 2003/361/CE) for every year under consideration in the
2004–2010 period (several employees in the [10, 250) range and total sales in the [2, 50) million euros
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range). The final dataset is an unbalanced panel of 26,504 firms for a total number of observations
equal to 159,026.
3.2. Variables
In our empirical analysis, the dependent variable is leverage, while the independent variables
are divided between regional variables and firm variables. The definitions of these variables are
presented below.
3.2.1. Dependent Variable
The dependent variable, leverage, is calculated as the ratio of total financial debt to total debt plus
equity (TDR) (trade credit is excluded). This variable has been widely used in previous studies, such as
Van der Wijst and Thurik [34], Michaelas et al. [35], Giannetti [4], Sogorb-Mira [36], Utrero-González [5],
La Rocca et al. [7], Degryse et al. [37], and Palacín-Sánchez and di Pietro [9].
3.2.2. Regional Variables
Our paper uses four regional variables (bank branches, banking market concentration, cost of
debt, and real economy), of which three are financial variables. The first variable is related to the
development of the financial sector and measures the degree of development of the Italian regional
banking sector by using as a proxy the number of regional bank branches per 10,000 inhabitants (Nº
Branches). This indicator has been taken from the Bank of Italy. Following Petersen and Rajan [38],
La Rocca et al. [7], and Palacín-Sánchez and di Pietro [9], the number of branches is linked to the degree
of the relationship between banks and SMEs. Therefore, the greater the number of branches, the better
the relationship and the less asymmetric the banking system information. Consequently, it is easier for
SMEs to be financed. Therefore, we anticipate a positive relationship with leverage.
The second financial variable is a proxy of the regional banking market concentration (Lerner).
The index was established by Coccorese and Pellechia [39] and is equivalent to a Lerner index on a
regional basis. This index is an appropriate indicator of market competition [9,40]. Carbó et al. [40]
highlight that the Lerner index is a superior measure of market power. This index varies between 0
and 1, with a zero value meaning high competition in the banking sector, while a value equal to 1
signifies the existence of market power. As stated above, due to the reduced negotiation power and
lower geographical mobility capacity of SMEs, especially in Italy, we expect a negative association
between the two variables.
The third financial variable is related to the regional cost of debt. This variable is measured as the
interest rate spread paid on cash loans, taking as a benchmark the average interest rate paid in the
Centre-North part of the country (Int_diff). The data source is the Bank of Italy. As we have previously
mentioned, we expect a negative relation with leverage.
Finally, the fourth regional variable is related to the real economy. We use the average annual
growth rate in GDP per capita by region (gdpg_regio). Regional GDP growth is commonly used as
a control variable for the economic situation. This variable comes from the Italian Statistics Office
(ISTAT).
3.2.3. Firm-Level Variables
Our paper uses six firm-level variables as proxies for size, asset structure, profitability, growth,
risk, and age. All of these variables have been used in previous capital structure studies.
The Size of firm (SIZE) is measured as the logarithm of total assets [7,37]. The Asset structure
(AS) is net fixed assets divided by the total assets of the firm [3,4,7,18,19]. The Profitability (PROF) is
defined as the ratio between the earnings before interest, taxes, amortization, and the depreciation
and total assets [3,7,19,36]. Growth (GROWTH) is measured as growth of the assets, calculated as
the annual percentage change of the total assets of the firm [37]. Business risk (RISK) is defined as
the within standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxes for each firm divided by its book
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value of total assets ([18,19,41]). Finally, the age of the firm (AGE) is measured as the logarithm of
the number of years that the firm has been operating [7]. According to previous studies on capital
structure in SMEs (e.g., [9]), the leverage of firms has a positive relationship with firm size, asset
structure, and growth, and a negative relationship with profitability, business risk, and age. Moreover,
to control for variation across business sectors, sectoral dummies are also added. Table 1 summarises
the explanatory variables considered in the current study and their expected signs.
Table 1. Explanatory variable signs.
Classification ExplanatoryVariable Notation
Hypotheses and
Expected Signs Data Source
Regional variables
Financial variable Bank branches No.Branches H1 (+) Bank of Italy [33]
Financial variable Lerner index Lerner H2a (-)H2b (+) Coccorese and Pellechia [39]
Financial variables Regional cost of debt Int_diff H3 (-) Bank of Italy [33]
Economy variable Real economy gdpg_regio H4 (+) Italian Statistics Office (ISTAT)
Firm-level
variables
Size of firm SIZE + CADS
Asset structure AS + CADS
Profitability PROF - CADS
Growth GROWTH + CADS
Business risk RISK - CADS
Age of firm AGE - CADS
Control variable Sectoral dummy
3.3. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents the average ratio of the total debt for each of the 20 regions of Italy and the
average regional variables across regions. All variables are estimated by region as the temporal average
over the period from 2004 to 2010. The average total debt ratio of Italy is 30.2% for the total sample of
Italian SMEs. On the other hand, by comparing, region by region, the level of debt for firms in the
sample, geographical differences can first be assessed. Campania has the lowest total debt ratio (26%),
whereas Umbria has the highest (32%). Moreover, these differences are also statistically significant
according to the analysis of variance (ANOVA) carried out (Bartlett’s test for equal variances: chi2(19)
= 302.3125; Prob > chi2 = 0.000). A Wilks’ lambda test of means for each variable is also displayed, and
the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected with a probability of 0%. In other words, all variables
are statistically different from the mean at the region basis. Overall, SMEs in southern Italy use fewer
external funds than do SMEs in northern Italy. This result is consistent with Coccorese [25]. It is also
worth mentioning the marked difference across regions for all the indicators. The number of bank
branches varies from the 2.63 for Calabria to 9.13 for Trentino Alto Adige. As far as the Lerner index is
concerned, the regions in the south of Italy present the highest values, denoting a more concentrated
banking market. Basilicata presents the greatest value (0.27), compared to Lombardy, which has the
lowest (0.13). With respect to the interest rate spread, SMEs located in Calabria pay an interest rate
1.34% higher than the Centre-North average. On the other hand, in Trentino Alto Adige, SMEs pay an
interest rate 0.35 lower than the Centre-North average. With regard to the real economy (gdpg_regio),
Lazio and Veneto are the regions with the highest growth, while Campania has the lowest growth.
Overall, differences are noted between financial and economic factors across regions. It remains to
be ascertained whether these regional differences impose any statistically significant effect on the
financing decisions of SMEs
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Table 2. Average regional variables across regions. TDR, total debt plus equity.
Region TDR No.Branches Lerner Int_diff% gdpg_regio
Abruzzo 0.302 5.114 0.217 0.6000 0.00191
Basilicata 0.281 4.200 0.274 0.8048 −0.0030
Calabria 0.267 2.634 0.269 1.341 −0.0035
Campania 0.267 2.788 0.216 0.952 −0.0044
Emilia Romagna 0.266 8.086 0.149 −0.162 0.007
Friuli VG 0.294 7.688 0.152 −0.059 0.004
Lazio 0.312 4.884 0.149 0.252 0.008
Liguria 0.287 6.188 0.189 0.164 0.004
Lombardia 0.269 6.635 0.132 −0.055 0.000
Marche 0.298 7.558 0.158 0.0741 0.003
Molise 0.288 4.460 0.271 1.0411 −0.001
Piemonte 0.309 6.026 0.150 0.209 −0.001
Puglia 0.271 3.435 0.213 0.756 −0.002
Sardegna 0.287 4.095 0.219 0.577 0.001
Sicilia 0.267 3.495 0.217 0.770 0.000
Tuscany 0.276 6.605 0.158 0.181 0.004
TrentinoAA 0.312 9.136 0.170 −0.356 0.007
Umbria 0.317 6.338 0.203 0.2637 −0.000
ValleDAosta 0.324 7.773 0.249 0.2535 0.008
Veneto 0.282 7.264 0.168 −0.0316 0.009
Wilks’ lambda test of means (F statistic) 193.39 2.5 × 105 9274.50 24024 149.86
Italy 0.302 6.398 0.1963 0.1209 0.003
Figure 1 shows a map of Italy in which the regions whose average ratio of total debt is under the
national average (in red). This map highlights the marked difference in the use of debt between the
north and the south of Italy.
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Finally, Table 3 displays the correlations between all study variables. Despite the statistical
significance due to the high number of observations, the absolute values of correlation coefficients
are quite low—well below the benchmark of 30%. The only exceptions are the correlations between
No.Branches, Lerner, and Int_diff. These regional financial variables are those that do not have
firm-level variability. The variance inflation factor (VIF), which is estimated to test possible problems of
collinearity, presents 7.41 as the highest value, a result that is below the limit denoting multicollinearity
problems (10).
Table 3. Correlation Matrix.
Variables TDR SIZE AS Profit Risk Growth AGE No.Branches lerner Int_dif gdpg_regio
TDR 1
SIZE 0.1332*** 1
AS 0.1091*** 0.1159*** 1
Profit −0.1659*** −0.0190*** 0.0196*** 1
Risk −0.0316*** −0.0486*** −0.0087** −0.0288*** 1
Growth −0.0093** 0.1056*** −0.0251*** 0.0765*** −0.0164*** 1
AGE −0.0264** 0.1385*** 0.1142*** −0.0040** −0.0195*** −0.0530*** 1
No.Branches 0.0487*** 0.0109** −0.0390*** 0.0370*** −0.0024 −0.0230*** 0.0957*** 1
Lerner −0.0022** −0.0124** 0.0778*** −0.0351*** −0.0155*** −0.0032 −0.0722*** −0.5230*** 1
Int_dif −0.0341*** −0.0117** 0.0656*** −0.0490*** −0.0055* 0.0151** −0.1022*** −0.6587*** 0.5845*** 1
gdpg_regio 0.0009 −0.0523*** −0.0933*** 0.0579*** 0.0104*** 0.0808*** −0.0630** 0.0343** −0.0853** −0.0975*** 1
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
3.4. Econometric Model
The empirical model is specified as follows:
TDRit = β0 + β1No.Branchesrt + β2Lernerrt + β3Intdi f f rt + β4gdpgrt + β5SIZEit + β6ASit
+β7PROFit + β8GROWTHit + β9RISKit + β10AGE + µi + εit
(1)
where i is the firm, r is the region, and t is the time period. The term µi represents the unobservable
individual effects, while εit is the possible heteroscedastic random error.
This paper exploits many advantages of using panel data to test the hypotheses stated in Section 2.
We are able to consider individual unobservable firm heterogeneity (such as managerial ability and
other nonmeasurable specificities of companies—possibly correlated with some explanatory variables)
and the changes in the model’s variables over time. Hence, as we mentioned above, we base our
inference on data that are more informative about the financial behaviour of SMEs. This approach
leads to an estimation that is less affected by collinearity problems and is more efficient.
The empirical model is first estimated by using fixed effects (within data transformation) and
random effect estimators to take the individual effects into account. We believe that the hypothesis
of the random effect estimator that firm-level variables are not correlated with the unobservable
individual effects is quite a strong assumption. The Hausman test is carried out to ascertain whether
the individual effects are fixed or random. In our analysis, this test confirms that the fixed effects model
is appropriate, while the random effect model runs the risk of not being consistent. Therefore, we will
present only the results of estimations with a fixed effect model. The Breusch–Pagan test rejects the
null hypothesis of the constant variance of the errors. For this reason, clustered standard errors are
used to address the problem.
Second, to handle the potential endogeneity problems of some explanatory variables, we use the
two-stage least squares within estimator (2SLS-IVwithin). We test for the possibility that the firm-level
variables (except age of firm) are endogenous, i.e., simultaneously correlated with the error term.
This new regression uses the first lag of asset structure, size of firm, profitability, risk and growth as
instrumental variables.
Finally, as a third estimator, we apply the Hausman–Taylor method to have an estimator that
can explicitly control for sectors and regional dummies (the within transformation of the other two
estimators does not allow the introduction of time invariant variables). This also allows us to take
into consideration in our specification sector and regional dummies (i.e., measurable individual effects
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that cannot be estimated by the fixed effect method based on the within transformation), and, at the
same time, to also handle the potential endogeneity problems described above. Nevertheless, a second
Hausman test that compares the estimation of IV2SLS and the Hausman–Taylor estimator highlights
that only the former is a consistent estimator in this case.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Baseline Model Results
Table 4 presents the estimates of our empirical specification. In commenting on the results, special
attention will be devoted to the regional variables. Overall, the results obtained by the three estimators
are similar, and, more importantly, almost all the regional variables are significant.
The proxy of regional financial development (Nº Branches) is significant and has a positive sign.
Therefore, the positive relation between financial development and debt is confirmed, fulfilling our
first hypothesis. This result is consistent with that of La Rocca et al. [7] and Palacín-Sánchez and di
Pietro [9]. Unlike La Rocca et al. [7], we use panel data instead of a one-year cross section, enabling us
to control for change in the Nº Branches across years.
The Lerner variable is significant for the three estimators, and the sign of the coefficient is negative,
indicating that less competition in the banking sector has the effect of a lower use of debt by SMEs.
Thus, we confirm our second hypothesis H2a. This result is consistent with Boot and Thakor [24],
Beck et al. [14], and Palacín-Sánchez and di Pietro [9].
The interest rate spread paid on cash loans with the Centre-North (Int_diff) has a negative, but
not significant, sign in all the regressions. The disincentive of a high interest rate for SMEs to apply for
external funding is perhaps difficult to capture at the regional level. It is more probable that different
SMEs inside the same region can obtain heterogeneous borrowing conditions depending on their
own default risk, the availability of collateral, and the degree of asymmetric information. Another
possibility is that credit rationing during the 2008–2010 crisis made it difficult to obtain loans on any
terms. This possibility is why it is interesting to divide what is shown by the estimates before and after
the crisis.
Finally, as the regional GDP growth (gdpg_regio) is always significantly positive, we validate
our fourth hypothesis—in regions with relatively higher economic growth, firms use bank debt
more intensively to finance their investments. This result is consistent with Demirguç-Kunt and
Maksimovic [17], Booth et al. [18], De Jong et al. [19], and Palacín-Sánchez and di Pietro [9].
Table 4. Estimation results.
Variables Fixed Effects Clustered St. error IV2SLS Hausman-Taylor
Constant
−0.083 *** −0.036 *** −0.099 ***
(−2.44) (−2.14) (−2.56)
No.Branches
0.002 ** 0.002 *** 0.004 ***
(4.47) (3.89) (4.15)
Lerner
−0.36 ** −0.21 ** −0.111 ***
(−2.47) (2.33) (−3.84)
Int_diff
−0.007 −0.005 −0.019
(−0.59) (−0.69) (−0.33)
gdpg_regio
0.085 *** 0.030 *** 0.054 ***
(8.24) (6.46) (9.11)
(−4.01) (3.81) (−10.82)
SIZE
0.049 *** 0.035 *** 0.049 ***
(39.56) (22.71) (42.44)
AS
0.018 *** 0.191 *** 0.012 ***
(5.15) (6.36) (3.85)
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Table 4. Cont.
Variables Fixed Effects Clustered St. error IV2SLS Hausman-Taylor
PROF
−0.219 *** −0.221 *** −0.215 ***
(−60.87) (−53.57) (−64.35)
GROWTH
−0.016 *** −0.012 *** −0.015 ***
(−19.82) (−11.57) (−19.93)
RISK
0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.013 ***
(6.23) (5.87) (6.67)
AGE
−0.0006 ** −0.0009 *** −0.0009 ***
(−0.66) (−3.23) (−6.53)
Sector dummies No No Yes
Regional dummies No No Yes
F-statistic 511.75 ***
Wald test 163000 *** 6738.90 ***
First Hausman Test (Fe vs RE) 265 ***
Second Hausman Test (FE vs HT) 640.75 ***
Number of Observations 157,625 115,410 157,625
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
With respect to the firm variables, asset structure, size, profitability, and age are significant and
have the expected sign. These results are consistent with those of authors such as Michaelas et al. [35],
Sogorb-Mira [36], and Degryse et al. [37]. On the other hand, the variable growth and business risk
have an opposite sign to the one we expected. The sign of growth suggests that companies use different
resources to finance debt to finance their growth, as also shown by Sarno [11]. The mixed sign of
business risk was also discussed in earlier empirical evidence [18,19,41]. However, we cannot draw
conclusions from this result due to the elementary measurement made from the operational risk, as also
happened to Michaelas et al. [37].
4.2. A Comparative Analysis between the No-Crisis and the Crisis Period
During the financial crisis (2008–2010), the Italian banking sector experienced several problems,
such as credit rationing, the capitalisation of various entities (including two of the five major banks in
the country), and a huge increase in the insolvency ratio.
To examine the possible differences in our regression due to the impact of the economic situation,
especially in the regional financial variables, we split the sample into no-crisis (2004–2007) and crisis
(2008–2010) periods. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5.
Table 5 shows certain differences between the two periods with respect to some explanatory
variables. The first result to highlight is the significantly negative relation between the cost of debt
(int_diff) and the level of debt before the crisis. In other words, as expected, in normal conditions of
the debt markets, a higher cost of debt implies less use of debt, which has an important implication,
because in Italy, large differences exist among regions. This variable is not significant in the crisis
period, perhaps because with the new conditions, access to credit is difficult regardless of price [13].
For the same reason, the No.Branches variable also ceases to be significant in the crisis period, showing
that the development of the financial sector loses its influence in the capital structure of SMEs in the
context of financial crisis. In contrast, we observe that the regional GDP growth (gdpg-regio) only
maintains its statistical significance during the crisis period, suggesting that the regional economy is
particularly relevant to explain the level of indebtedness of SMEs in times of crisis. Overall, hypotheses
H1 and H3 are not confirmed in the crisis period, hypothesis H2a is confirmed in both periods (no-crisis
and crisis), and hypothesis H4 is only confirmed in the crisis period. Firm variables keep their signs
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and statistical significance. However, the risk variable only maintains its statistical significance in the
pre-crisis period.
Table 5. Comparative analysis between the pre-crisis and crisis periods.
Variables Fixed Effects Clustered St. Error(2004–2007)
Fixed Effects Clustered St. Error
(2008–2010)
Constant
−0.369 *** −0.238 ***
(−8.27) (−3.31)
No.Branches
0.011 *** 0.0009
(3.50) (0.811)
Lerner
−0.344 ** −0.404 **
(−2.01) (−2.39)
Int_diff
−0.045 *** −0.023
(−3.04) (−1.57)
gdpg_regio 0.024 0.070 ***
(0.79) (6.49)
SIZE
0.078 *** 0.065 ***
(43.92) (19.13)
AS
0.194 *** 0.154 ***
(33.31) (19.72)
PROF
−0.203 *** −0.229 ***
(−44.68) (−36.72)
GROWTH
−0.010 *** −0.022 ***
(−10.67) (−13.27)
RISK
0.015 *** 0.029
(4.8) (0.89)
AGE
−0.0026 ** −0.005 ***
(−7.57) (−12.49)
Sector dummies No No
Regional dummies No No
F-statistic 373.5 *** 172.19 ***
First Hausman Test (Fe vs RE) 178 *** 158 ***
Number of Observations 98,278 59,455
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
5. Conclusions
This study aims to offset the lack of a regionalised approach in the identification of the relationship
between financial and economic factors in the capital structure of SMEs. Nevertheless, at least in
southern Europe, intracountry differences are large. The regional analysis enables better identification
of the relationship between institutional factors and the capital structure of SMEs.
Our article empirically analyses the regional financial and economic differences in Italian SME
leverage from 2004 to 2010, using an unbalanced panel dataset of 159,026 observations. Our results
suggest that differences in the degree of financial sector development, banking concentration, and the
local economic situation have a significant impact on the level of leverage for SMEs. These findings are
consistent with studies on capital structure that use the regional level and, more generally, with authors
who claim that institutional factors influence how firms are financed [4,6,7,9,17,20,42,43]. Three of the
four hypotheses formulated have been verified. The estimation results show that a more developed
financial system favours the use of debt as a financial source and that a more concentrated banking
market reduces the use of debt by SMEs. Moreover, regional economic development has a positive
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effect on SME debt. However, the hypothesis of the influence of debt costs on leverage has been only
partially verified.
Moreover, when we analysed the influence of regional variables, distinguishing between the
pre-crisis and the crisis periods, the results show that the cost of debt and the Nº branches have
only been verified in the pre-crisis period, and the regional GDP growth maintains only its statistical
significance during the crisis period. These differences in the significance of the regional variables
support the fact that, currently, the new conditions of access to credit have become more difficult.
Therefore, the relationship between these variables and the level of leverage of SMEs depends on the
economic situation.
Overall, our research shows that in a country with large regional differences, such as Italy, the
decision of how to finance investments involves not only business criteria but also institutional factors,
creating a diversity of opportunities depending on where the enterprise is located. Moreover, these
regional differences could influence regional economic resilience because the more financial resources
available, the greater the capacity to adapt and thrive under adverse environmental conditions.
According to our results, it is important to take into account the regional financial system, especially
in the case of SMEs, which are more affected by difficulties in accessing financing compared to
large companies. This effect is especially important in times of economic instability. Moreover, our
findings should be used by policymakers to reduce these differences, since government actions and
decision-making are the main factors affecting social resilience, which can be considered a guarantee of
regional resilience [12].
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